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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a visitor who seeks to catalog the variety of written texts
American government uses to communicate its powers and its citizens'
rights and obligations. She might organize those texts into the following
pyramid:

* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. I am fortunate to
owe intellectual debts not only to many scholarly colleagues-Robert Anthony, Cynthia
Farina, William Funk, Ronald Levin, Gerald Neuman, John Manning, Henry Monaghan,
Todd Rakoff and Roy Schotland-but also to lawyers from government and private
practice, who as members of the ABA's Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice have attended the growth of these ideas over their long gestation. I will mention
here Daniel Cohen, Neil Eisner, Ernest Gellhom, Jeff Lubbers, and Randolph May, knowing
I may have slighted others. Any inaccuracies and faults in this paper are entirely my own.
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A Constitution, adopted by "the people"
Hundreds of statutes, adopted by an elected Congress
Thousands of regulations, adopted by politically responsible executive officials
Tens of thousands of interpretations and other guidance documents, issued by responsible bureaus
Countless advice letters, press releases, and other statements of understanding, generated by individual bureaucrats

On inquiry she would find that we understand passably well the ordering
and influence of the top three layers of this structure. Our legal system
treats each of them as binding text, subject only to the requirements that it
be authorized by the superior authority and appropriately adopted following
designated procedures; if valid, each of them has legislative effect on
government and citizen alike, until displaced by another text validly
adopted at the same or a higher level. She would find, too, that the
innumerable items at the base of this pyramid, while often in fact
influential on private conduct, are denied any formal jural effect. It is at
the fourth level that she would find confusion-confusion whether these
"publication rules," as we will call them for reasons that will presently
appear, are legitimate instruments of agency policy or a ruse to evade the
higher procedural obligations associated with adopting regulations;'
confusion whether an agency may give them any jural effect and, if so, to
what degree; and confusion whether and to what extent they must be
respected by the courts.
Publication rules-interpretative rules, statements of general policy,
staff manuals, and the like-are an important element in the hierarchy of
agency law. Undoubtedly, rules within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 2 they are generally adopted at staff levels within an
agency to guide both staff conduct and public knowledge, without3
following the notice-and-comment procedures of section 553 of that act.
If they have been published, however, sections 552(a)(1) and (2) of the
APA permit agencies to rely upon them in their dealings with the public.
Publication rules include the advice the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
publishes, telling the public how it interprets IRS statutes and regulations;
regulatory guidance the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the

1. This article uses the word "rule" to connote any action meeting APA Section 551's
definition of "rule," and the word "regulation" to signify a rule that is adopted following
section 553's notice-and-comment procedures, that must be published in the Federal
Register and that, if valid, has the effect of a statute on all actors.
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
3. See id. § 553. Staff offices preparing publication rules frequently do tell those
likely to be affected that they are doing so, and provide an opportunity for exchange, but not
within the formal structures of section 553. See infra note 128.
4. See id. § 552(a)(l)-(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides for manufacturers subject
to their regulation, spelling out detailed courses of action the agency's staff
has decided it will accept as establishing compliance with FDA or FAA
regulatory requirements; and manuals the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) issues to its inspectors, instructing them how to
perform inspections and how to respond to particular conditions they may
find-by seeking a fine, by asking for correction, and so forth.
These rules are common and generally salutary forms of informal
agency action in use well before the Administrative Procedure Act was
enacted in 1946, 5 and their volume greatly exceeds that of notice-andcomment regulation. To take just one example, consider the facts revealed
in National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 6 written
three decades ago by Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit. He
learned that each year the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour
Administration responded to 750,000 requests for advice about the
interpretation and application of the Fair Labor Standards Act; 10,000 of
these responses were signed by the Administrator herself and the rest, by
staff. These advisory letters were interpretative rules, Judge Leventhal
concluded. The question he had to decide was whether the letter before him
was "final agency action" ripe for review.
When the author of this article was General Counsel of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in 1975-77-the years, readers may recognize,
just preceding the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.s-any regulation
the Commission adopted was considered, often in detail, by the five
Commissioners themselves. These Commission regulations generally set
performance standards for nuclear safety, as even then was thought
preferable, rather than specify the details of design-a difference often
identified in the literature as that between having "standards" and having
"rules." The bulk of the work for one of the Commission's five bureaus
was continually to generate guidance for license applicants and others
about technical design issues raised by these regulatory standards. It issued
this guidance in a volume dwarfing the regulations; and these guidance
instruments, which the Commission expected to be the product of informal
consultation by responsible staff with affected parties, were supervised by
the Commission in only a general way. Another bureau, in charge of
5. See, e.g., Helco Prods. Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943), distinguished
in Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151 (1967); Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning
Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698-700 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6. 443 F.2d at 691-92.
7. See infra Part 1i.
8. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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inspections and enforcement, produced copious guidance for the
Commission's inspectors. Both sorts of guidance, understandably, were
earnestly sought out by those the Commission regulated, and greatly
influenced their conduct. From an internal perspective the guidance also
contributed to the discipline of staff action, its predictability and regularity.
Comparable practices and proportions, in response to similar levels of
public demand for guidance and central agency interest in controlling a
farflung staff, can be found at many, if not all, regulatory agencies. The
result is an enormous output of publication rules, far greater than the pages
of the Federal Register, and (in proportional terms) rarely challenged in
litigation.
The provisions of the APA appear straightforwardly to acknowledge the
existence of publication rules and provide minimal procedures to govern
their adoption. The APA's section 553, which defines notice-and-comment
procedures for regulations, has from the beginning excepted from those
procedures all "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice." 9 Since the Freedom of
Information Act was first enacted in 1966, section 552(a)(2) of the APA
has provided that "[a] final order, opinion, statement of policy,
interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the
public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a
party other than an agency only if" it has been published and indexed as the
statute provides, or the party has had actual and timely notice of it. The
Congress that enacted this language was aware of the importance of
publication rule practice and chose only the requirement of publication as
its legislative response; putting an end to secret law, not additional
proceduralization, was its aim.' 0
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994).
10. See S. 1160, 89th Cong. (1965).
[Slubsection (b) of S. 1160 would require agencies to make available statements of
policy, interpretations, staff manuals, and instructions that affect any member of the
public. This material is the end product of Federal administration. It has the force
and effect of law in most cases, yet under the [unamended APAJ these Federal
agency decisions have been kept secret from the members of the public affected by
the decisions.
. . .This law is embodied in thousands of orders, opinions, statements, and
instructions issued ,by hundreds of agencies. This is the material which would be
made available ....However, under S. 1160 an agency may not be required to make
available ...any advisory interpretation on a specific set of facts which is requested
by and addressed to a particular person, provided that such interpretation is not cited
or relied upon by any officer or employee of the agency as a precedent in the
disposition of other cases.
Subsection (b) would help bring order out of the confusion of agency orders,
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Just as the D.C. Circuit encrusted notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures with judicial "innovations" before the Vermont Yankee opinion
emphasized its obligation to respect the decisions made by section 553, in
recent years that court-seeing only those cases citizens have cared to
litigate-has repeatedly required increasing formalization of publication
rulemaking, and done so without any attention to the provisions of section
552(a). Cases in that circuit now require the use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking to set enforcement policy if knowledge of that policy might be
expected inevitably to shape private conduct." Other cases reason that
once an agency has used a publication rule to interpret its regulations, any
further differing interpretation may be adopted only by the use of noticeand-comment rulemaking. The most recent of these cases give this
formality-triggering characteristic to actions taken by staff in one distant
region; the consequence of doing so is effectively to forbid the agency's
central administration from ever itself issuing an interpretive rule. 12 Yet
another case appears to go out of its way to denounce the practice of using
publication rules,
as if such rules were characteristic of lawless agency
3
maneuvering.
opinions, policy statements, interpretations, manuals, and instructions by requiring
each agency to maintain for public inspection an index of all the documents having
precedential significance ....
...

As an incentive to establish an effective indexing system,... no agency action

may be relied upon, used, or cited as a precedent against a private party unless it is
indexed or unless the private party has adequate notice of the terms of the agency
order.
H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 7-8 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2424-25. No
controversy appears respecting the language of the Senate bill, which had previously been
adopted by the Senate and was adopted without amendment by the House.
!1. See Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987), discussed in
Richard M. Thomas, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young
and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADmIN. L. REv. 131 (1992); see also Chamber of Commerce v.

U.S. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1999), discussed in Theresa Titolo, Comment,
The Aftermath of Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Labor and Its Implications for

OSHA Reform (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
12. See Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Both cases are discussed in Richard J. Pierce, Jr., DistinguishingLegislative Rules From
Interpretative Rules, 52 ADmN. L. REV. 547 (2000) and Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska
Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 COLUM.

L. REV. 155 (2001). A different, and less problematic, proposition is that where a regulation
has embodied the interpretation of a statute, an agency can change that statutory
interpretation only by amending the regulation by further notice-and-comment rulemaking,
and not by issuing an interpretive rule. See Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n
v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
13. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see
also infra note 86.
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It is not hard to find considerations supporting the outcomes of these
decisions. Private parties may have acted in reliance on an understanding
about the state of the law which a publication rule subsequently undercut.
The notorious ossification of notice-and-comment rulemaking in recent
years, a response to the minority of regulations having major economic
impact, has greatly increased its cost at the same time as agencies have
experienced increasing stringency in the resources available to them. The
more costly it becomes to generate regulations, and the fewer resources
agencies have available to pay those costs, the greater will be the
temptation to find other means to generate policy-shortcutting a desirable,
even necessary public process.' 4 The contested cases sometimes appear to
result from clumsy lawyering or overreaching claims in court on the
agencies' part. If an agency has instructed its inspectors to file complaints
when they find certain precise factual conditions that agency higher-ups
have concluded signal a violation of a standard embodied in its regulations,
inspectors may carelessly allege the existence of the factual conditions,
rather than a violation of the standard, as the basis on which they seek a
fine. When these interpretations are challenged in court, the proliferation
of rules seeming to require courts to accept agency interpretations as
binding upon them may encourage agency lawyers to claim more
deferential ground for their client than they wisely should.
Without wishing to deny that these forces are at work, this Paper draws
its orientation from the explicit provisions of the APA and from the
proposition that the precedential force it permits interpretive and policy
documents is grounded in sound policy considerations.
Agency
administration is aided when central officials can advise responsible
bureaucrats how they should apply agency law. Citizens are better off if
they can know about these instructions and rely on agency positions, with
the assurance of equal treatment such central advice permits, than if they
are remitted to the discretion of local agents and to "secret law."
Particularly in a society that has come to believe standards are a better
instrument of regulation than detailed command-and-control rules, even an
ideal level of rulemaking will generate an enormous range of issues on
which interpretation and policy analysis will be required. These are the
predominant occasions for publication rulemaking, and the resulting
publication rules very rarely reach the courts.
In discouraging the use of these rules or making it more expensive, the
judicial responses threaten important sources of information for citizens
14. Concrete measures of the phenomenon are hard to come by, though claims that the
temptation is being yielded to are frequent. For one thoughtful effort at measurement, see
Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 159, 168 (2000).
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and important encouragements to agency regularity and even-handedness.
As the House Committee remarked on reporting what is now APA section
552(a)(2) to the floor,
This material is the end product of Federal administration. It has the force and effect
of law in most cases ....
lEmbodied in thousands of orders, opinions, statements, and instructions issued
by hundreds of agencies....
...

Subsection (b) would help bring order out of the confusion of agency orders,
opinions, policy statements, interpretations, manuals, and instructions by requiring
each agency to maintain for public inspection an index of all the documents having
precedential significance ....
As an incentive to establish an effective indexing system, . . no agency action
may be relied upon, used, or cited as a precedent against a private party unless it is
indexed
or unless the private party has adequate notice of the terms of the agency
15
order.
...

Changed approaches, moreover, are particularly likely after the
inauguration of a new president, who will believe he has won a mandate to
use executive power in a manner different from his predecessor. Unless the
prior interpretations were put in place by regulation,16 characterizing these
changes as lawless maneuvering begs important questions about what a
change in administration means. It seems at least contestable whether, if
President Clinton's was the first administration informally to interpret an
agency regulation, that fact condemns President George W. Bush's and all
succeeding administrations to do their interpreting by notice-and-comment
rulemaking. These are the premises on which this Paper proceeds.
This topic is hard to write about. This is, in part, because so many
relationships are involved: the legislature, the courts, an agency, the various
staff offices within the agency, and the citizens subject to agency action.
Within each of these relationships lie possibilities both of control and of
influence that we must explore. Difficulties also arise out of doctrinal
considerations-issues of reviewability, such as finality and ripeness, need
to be kept distinct from questions about required procedure, and these in
turn differ from the issue of what standards of review are appropriate.
Within the framework of the standard of review question lurks issues about

15.

H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 7-8 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2424-

25.
16. See Nat ' Family Planning,979 F.2d at 23 1.

810
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whether executive decisions respecting enforcement are reviewable at all, 7
knotty problems of government estoppel and agency non-acquiescence; the
application and meaning of the Supreme Court's protean decision in
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; S the
Court's recent revival of attention to Skidmore v. Swift & Co.'9 in
Christensen v. Harris Counli/ and United States v. Mead Corp.;2 ' the
Chevron-analogs for reviewing agency interpretations of regulations,
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.22 and Stinson v. United States;23 and
the Court's usual insistence, respecting statutes, that once it has spoken on
an interpretive question, the result can be changed only by statute.24
The analytic tools commentators employ can also be misleading. The
anthropomorphic tendency to treat agencies as if they were a single human
actor is particularly distracting and distorting when one is analyzing a
medium that the constituent elements of complex institutions use to speak
to each other. 25 Moreover, discussion sometimes proceeds as if the issue to
be examined is whether agency actions are "binding" or not-as if there

17. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
20. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
21. 121 S. Ct 2164 (2001).
22. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
23. 508 U.S. 36 (1993). Accord Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996), discussed in United
States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 2182 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. In a widely publicized recent brouhaha, an OSHA official responded by letter (two
years late) to an inquiry whether employers would be responsible for dangerous conditions
in workers' homes, if they had their employees work at home. He indicated a view that they
would. Subsequently, this letter was made generally available by posting it on the OSHA
web site. It was found there by another employer, who caused an eruption of congressional
and public criticism that led to the withdrawal of the letter and its eventual replacement by
the opposite interpretation-now with the imprimatur of not only OSHA's Administrator
but also the Secretary of the Department of Labor. See Randolph J. May, Ruling Without
Real Rules: Or How to Influence Private Conduct Without Really Binding, 53 ADMIN. L.

REv. (forthcoming Dec. 2001).
From a certain perspective, this is a success story about the use of publication rules. It
would be unreasonable to think that the first moves were the "agency's" acts in a strongly
descriptive sense. They occurred at relatively deep staff levels. The subsequent
developments indicated both the availability of internal review and its effectiveness in a
case of significant controversy. That the agency was willing to provide advice, that initial
advice in response to individual inquiry constituted a step distinct from advice to the public
at large, and that advice to the public could be taken up the chain of command for effective
review, all seem highly desirable features. Worlds without advice, or without distinctions as
to the seriousness and breadth with which it is offered, or without internal checks on its
accuracy, would seem quite a bit less desirable.
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were only two choices. The APA, however, describes the permitted legal
force of agency actions in three ways: actions validly adopted pursuant to
congressionally authorized rulemaking procedures have the kind of
authority we commonly ascribe to statutes; actions that meet the
publication requirements of section 552(a) have such authority as we
commonly ascribe to precedents; and in other cases, agencies are not
permitted to treat their actions as having legal force on citizens. Echoing
Skidmore, the recent Christensen and Mead Corp. decisions similarly
remind us that there are in fact three possibilities-not only control and
irrelevance, but also influence. Keeping in mind the statutory recognition
of influence, of precedential force, considerably aids analysis.
A student analysis of one of the recent D.C. Circuit cases remarked on
an ongoing tension between the Supreme Court and that court, as both have
struggled to balance some measure of restraint and accountability with efficiency in
defining the proper power and scope of agency rulemaking. But while the Supreme
Court has increasingly moved towards a more "hands off" approach, trusting the
political process to ensure agency fairness, the26D.C. Circuit has maintained a much
more skeptical stance toward agency discretion.

Almost a quarter century ago, the Supreme Court spoke to that tension in
Vermont Yankee, forbidding that court from overriding the procedural
instructions of the APA's specification of notice-and-comment procedures
for rulemaking. If we could imagine a similar outcome grounded in the
APA's express recognition that agencies are permitted to rely upon their
publication rules, what might that instruction look like? The pages
following suggest a set of principles whose observance could avoid what is
now a considerable threat to one of the major protections administrative
law offers against arbitrary government:
1) Section 552 permits agencies to give publication rules precedential
effect, reflecting the values both of effective supervision of the bureaucracy
and of providing reliable notice to the public of agency policies and
understandings.
2) Centrally generated publication rules likely to significantly affect private
conduct are ordinarily "final agency action" subject, if ripe, to judicial
review.
3) In reviewing a publication rule, courts need give only Skidmore weight
to an agency's determination that its existing statutes and regulations
authorize that rule.
26. Connolly, supra note 12, at 162 (citing Thomas, supra note 11, at 131).
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4) In determining whether an agency's existing statutes and regulations
authorize a publication rule, a court may consider whether the agency's
regulations fail to articulate important policy conclusions it could
reasonably have been expected to reach. Any conclusion that an agency's
regulations are insufficiently specific in some particular, however, must be
made in the context of the agency's array of statutes and regulations as a
whole, and the predictable importance of that particular to the agency and
those it regulates in the context of its general responsibilities.
5) Agencies may freely revise publication rules, subject to the usual
constraint of having to justify changes in policy.
A FRAMING CASE: HOCTOR V. US. DEPARTMENT OFAGRICULTURE
27
The relatively simple facts of Hoctorv. US. DepartmentofAgriculture

I.

can help to frame the discussion. Hoctor had a game farm near Terre
Haute, Indiana, where he raised lions, tigers, and other big cats. The
Animal Welfare Act of 1966 required the licensing of his operations by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). That Act authorized the
Secretary "to promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders as he may
deem necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]" 28 and to
develop standards "to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and
transportation of animals by dealers .... "2 9 These standards must include
minimum requirements "for handling, housing, feeding, watering,
sanitation," etc. 30 The Department has adopted many regulations over the
years-sometimes quite detailed (as in the case of dogs, cats, hamsters, and
the like), but for less commonly raised and exhibited animals like Hoctor's,
they are more general. For example, 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a), which governs
the required structures for housing those animals, provides:
The facility must be constructed of such material and of such strength as appropriate
for the animals involved. The indoor and outdoor housing facilities shall be
structurally sound and shall be maintained in good repair to protect the animals from
injury and to contain the animals.

Plainly, this does not tell Hoctor exactly what to do-how high, for
example, to build a perimeter fence around his property that will keep his
lions and tigers out of the surrounding schoolyards and cattle lots. 31 It only
27. 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
28.
29.
30.
31.

7 U.S.C. § 2151 (1994).
Id. § 2143(a)(1).
Id. § 2143(a)(2)(A).
The assumption here, as in Hoctor, is that the Secretary was authorized to adopt
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tells him what tests he will have to meet, and if he wants more detailed
information he will have to get it elsewhere.
Subject to vagueness concerns, this characteristic is not a failing of the
regulation, but an asset. The difference between rules and standards is
commonplace in the literature, and the consensus is that standards are
preferable. Almost twenty years ago, Colin Diver wrote a magisterial
article with an evocative title: The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules.32 That title nicely fits a theme of recent writings about regulatory
reform-that detailed, central, top-down command structures, in which
Washington bureaucrats tell citizens exactly how to build a ladder or in
other ways order their lives, have proved ineffective and inefficient. The
better way is to set a standard that the citizen is obliged to meet, and to
leave it to the ingenuity of the citizen to decide exactly how to do so. Of
course, the Hoctor standard could have been a better one. 33 The
Department might, for example, have added:
A structure is in violation of this rule if found insufficient to prevent escape by an
average animal of the species contained therein.

This addition would give more information about how one could identify a
violation, but it would still be a standard, not a rule.
Essential to this discussion is the proposition that, despite this
characteristic, section 3.125(a) of the C.F.R. is a valid regulation, and
unless its standard is so vague as to leave ordinary persons at sea about
what is being required of them, the Department may sanction people who
violate it 34 To preclude the Department's approach and require it to enact
species-specific detail would be to reject, pro tanto, the preference for
standards. Preclusion might also inflict an unsustainable expectation of
foresight or detail on agency rulemakers-as if they must anticipate just
what animals are to be contained, what range of physical characteristics
each possesses, and other such information much more readily at hand to
(and properly demanded of) the animals' keepers than the Department's
central bureaus. In worlds of regulation intensely more technological and
containment rules to protect the surrounding environment from the animals being contained,
as well as vice versa. As Judge Posner intimated, one could question whether an "Animal
Welfare Act" in fact authorizes such rules. See 82 F.3d at 168-69.
32. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65

(1983).
33. Considerations of equal protection or due process arguably govern the precision
required of standards, as for example judicial standards for assessing the clear intent of a
voter. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-09 (2000); see also John F. Manning,
ConstitutionalStructureand JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules,

96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 669-70 (1996).
34. Cf Manning, supranote 33, at 669-70, 670 n.281.
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safety-oriented than the USDA's supervision of wild animal farms-say,
nuclear power plant regulation, or airframe approval-the regulations for
which the politically accountable leadership is responsible consistently
frame standards, which are then elaborated in detail by regulatory guidance
documents generated by engineering staffs, usually after informal
exchanges with the regulated industry. It is not, then, a proper complaint
about the USDA's performance that its regulations failed in terms to
require eight-foot perimeter fences for big cats, rather than a "facility...
constructed of such material and of such strength as appropriate for the
animals involved.., structurally sound and... maintained in good repair
to protect the animals from injury and to contain the animals. "35
Still, it will be helpful to the Hoctors of this world, and to the inspectors
who patrol their compliance with rules like these, if safe harbors can be
defined.
From an agency perspective, uniformity of administration
nationwide is desirable and the agency may doubt whether its pool of notso-well-paid inspectors will be able to handle so much discretion.
Adopting regulations would require the time of the agency's limited toplevel management and costly formality to create or alter. If the top of the
agency's hierarchy is not the place for generating species-by-species cageand-fence detail, a central, responsible staff office may be. Having
regulations that set standards virtually requires the emergence of advice to
tell game park owners and departmental inspectors alike what kind of fence
will be regarded as "structurally sound" to contain lions and tigers.
Periodic advice from a responsible staff office can provide those who are
disposed to cooperate with regulation with a framework for achieving
compliance efficiently and confidently. It can create a framework for staff
advice and enforcement that enhances both the agency's internal discipline
and the regularity and equal treatment citizens experience.
In light of APA section 552(a), this advice can take a variety of forms.
One can imagine five different ways in which Hoctor might have
discovered the Department's specific judgment:
1) He might have found an interpretive rule stating that "facilities . . .
structurally sound ... to contain the animals," requires that big cats be
enclosed in an eight-foot perimeter fence.
2) He might have found a policy document announcing that the Department
had decided on the basis of recent studies and literature to seek fines and

35. Specifications for the Humane Handling, Care, Treatement, and Transportation of
Warmblooded Animals Other Than Dogs, Cats, Rabbits, Hamsters, Guinea Pigs, Nonhuman
Primates, and Marine Mammals, 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a) (2001).
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other sanctions against licensed dealers whose facilities for big cats lacked
eight-foot perimeter fences.
3) He might have found an inspector's manual directing the Department's
inspectors to accept eight-foot perimeter fences as complying with the
regulation, and/or to issue citations to dealers with lower or absent
perimeter fences.
4) He might have found prior administrative adjudications deciding that the
structural standard was met by eight-foot perimeter fences but not by
seven-foot perimeter fences.
5) When seeking his license, he might have asked a local Department
veterinarian, lacking further guidance from above, what height of perimeter
fence would meet the regulation.
Note that this Paper, here as elsewhere, treats all publication rules alike.
Section 552(a) does not distinguish among interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or staff manuals (or, for that matter, agency
adjudicative precedent). The D.C. Circuit 36 and some commentators have
devoted considerable effort to distinguishing among these forms.37 Rather
than distinguish among the forms, this Paper prefers to distinguish between
two different settings in which agencies may try to use any of them: in the
first setting, the publication rule purports to draw on some existing source
of agency legal authority, statute and/or regulation; in the second, it does
not. Todd Rakoff has persuasively characterized the difference between
American and Japanese informal procedure as being, precisely, that
Japanese administrative law contemplates legitimate informal agency
action, what the Japanese term "guidance," that is concededly beyond the
reach of direct statutory or regulatory requirements, while American
administrative law does not.38 The question of authority is central to the
analysis being offered here. Nothing said should be taken to suggest that a
publication rule can have the influence permitted by section 552(a), in the
36. E.g., Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Syncor Int'l
Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). As in Hudson, further discussed infra
at pp. 821-22, the D.C. Circuit's distinctions may be the product of understandable efforts to
limit the harm done by other panels' questionable holdings about "interpretative rules;" the
alternative, under current practice, would be to force en banc consideration of the issue, a
procedurally and politically costly step.
37. See Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive"Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious"
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADmn. L.J. AM. U. 1, 10 (1994) [hereinafter Anthony, Lifting the
Smog]. See generally Pierce, supra note 12.
38. See Rakoff, supra note 14, at 168-69.
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absence of some such relationship to a superior norm. Whichever form it
takes, its permitted influence depends on its reasonable relationship to
requirements enunciated in statute or regulation, which the publication rule
serves to make more concrete in particular circumstances.
This defining characteristic also eliminates any need here to plumb other
issues of definition that have plagued some discussions. 39 Regulations can
only be made by using notice-and-comment rulemaking or qualifying for
one of the exceptions to section 553 of the APA that permits agencies to
claim the force of statutes for their rules even if those procedures have not
been used. Nothing in the APA permits an agency to claim legislative
force for a publication rule. If an agency wishes to claim that force for a
rule, section 552 is simply beside the point. If it does not claim that force
for a rule, if it simply asserts that it may rely on its previously announced
rule in dealings with citizens premised on authority or regulatory
commands elsewhere grounded, then section 553 is irrelevant. It may well
be that such announcements will contribute to significant changes in
private conduct; but if it is not the announcement itself that the agency
relies upon should it attempt to command those changes, the fact of such
reliance is no more than section 552 anticipates. A bit more care from
agency counsel about the precise source of authority an agency is claiming,
within the agency and, especially, when judicial review is sought, could
work wonders.40
As Judge Posner reported the facts, Hoctor chose the fifth of the routes
listed above-the one that will prevail when an agency has not used
publication rules, and consequently the one that leaves matters to the
discretion of an uninstructed street-level bureaucrat. In 1982, an inspecting
Department veterinarian told Hoctor that to get a license he would have to
build a six-foot perimeter fence around his whole property, in addition to
pens for the big cats and a containment fence around their immediate area.
Hoctor built all of these and was licensed. In 1983, the following year, the
Department added a provision to the manual it uses to instruct its
inspectors, telling them to apply an eight-foot standard for perimeter fences
39. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-09
(D.C. Cir. 1993). See generally Pierce, supra note 12.
40. See Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 212
F.3d 1301, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This may be easier said than done, of course. An
experienced correspondent, who directs the legal office responsible for regulation in a
department with many rulemaking bureaus, wrote after seeing a draft of this paper,
The problem of tying a violation to an agency handbook (even internal ones) rather
than a rule, as you note... is more common than it should be. No matter how many
memos the General Counsel or I put out, no matter how often we raise it in training
courses, I still hear "the [non-notice-and-comment] guidance manual requires it."
E-mail (Jan. 11, 2001) (on file with author).
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for dangerous animals under its containment standard. It was not until
seven years later, in 1990, that "Hoctor was cited by a Department of
Agriculture inspector for violating... the housing standard, by failing to
have an eight-foot perimeter fence. Eventually the Department sanctioned
Hoctor for this and other alleged violations, and he . .. sought judicial
review limited... to the perimeter fence."'4 1
Although Judge Posner did not address it specifically, this element of
reliance on local official advice in making an expensive investment
complicates the analysis, and in my judgment tends to explain the cases
fairly well. This turns out to be another of those contexts in which courts
have struggled to free citizens from the death grip of the rule that the
government cannot be estopped by the errors of its agents. But for the
moment it will be useful to focus on the first four of these possibilitiesinterpretive rules, statements of general policy, staff manuals, and decisions
in adjudicated cases-by which the Department's view might be
elucidated.
II. FINALITY AND RIPENESS
Judge Posner did not have to consider the reviewability of the manual
provision at issue in Hoctor, because the case before him involved a
concrete application of the understanding reflected there to impose a fine
on a citizen. If the Department had given excessive jural force to its
manual provision, treating it as if it were a regulation, the order imposing
that fine-undoubtedly it was both final agency action and ripe for
review-should be reversed. In other cases, however, citizens or the
regulated may wish to challenge the validity of a publication rule in
advance of its concrete application. As in the case of a regulation, in some
circumstances conformity may be so simple, and the consequences of
disregarding a publication rule that would be upheld may be so severe, as
to make those who learn of a publication rule unwilling to take the risk of
its concrete application to them. Unless able to challenge it in advance of
its application, they will follow the course it counsels, and its validity will
never be assessed. In other circumstances, those who are the objects of
regulation may welcome a publication rule, that members of the public
believe inadequately protective of their interests; again, because the
regulated will comply, there will never be a concrete application of the rule
that could be tested on judicial review. This, for example, was the setting
in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,4 2 where the FDA had issued
enforcement guidelines setting a tolerance level for aflatoxin, a naturally
occurring carcinogen unavoidably associated, to some degree, with corn;
41. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1996).
42. 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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the guideline instructed its inspectors not to interfere with corn shipments
having a lower aflatoxin level. This created a safe harbor grain merchants
warmly desired. However, the Community Nutrition Institute believed that
the harbor was in fact not safe for the corn-consuming public and
successfully challenged its adoption as a publication rule rather than a
regulation.
The reader may already have grasped that permitting review of
publication rules prior to their application presents all the considerations
associated with the Supreme Court's opinion, increasingly controversial in
some quarters, in Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner.43 Similarly, permitting
review at the behest of those not subject to the rule raises ripeness
controversies parallel to those that have sharply divided the Supreme Court
and commentators in other settings in recent years." This is not the place
to explore those controversies as they arise in the context of regulations
produced by notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. It is, however,
necessary to address some additional considerations that can be adduced
concerning publication rules. In addition to the arguments against the preapplication reviewability of regulations, one may also marshal the
structural contingency of any publication rule. Unlike a regulation, which
enjoys statutory effect and can be altered only by the relatively formal
procedures of notice-and-comment rulemaking, a publication rule is merely
influential; it can be freely altered at any point before it has been concretely
applied-and, indeed, the agency issuing it must be prepared to treat it as
provisional, in the sense that it must permit arguments for its alteration to
be made in any proceeding to apply it. Whether, then, it is properly
regarded as a "final agency action" is a more difficult question than
appeared in Abbott Laboratories.
Important to the resolution of that question, moreover, are two additional
considerations that tend to defeat conclusions for reviewability. First, and
associated with the contingency of a publication rule's proposition, would
be understandings about the value, volume, and provenance of many such
rules. Knowledge of an agency's interpretations, policies, etc., is a positive
good, and voluntary agency creation of publication rules, therefore, ought
not be discouraged-as the prospect of easy review might tend to do.
Moreover, given the volume at which publication rules appear relative to
regulations, it is likely that most, if not all, will be generated at agency staff
43. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 89-91 (1995); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVED L.
HARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFETY 246-47 (1990).
44. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization ofPublic Law,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1447 (1988).
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levels that make ascribing "finality" to them -questionable within the
agency's own hierarchy; higher officials, that is, will rarely have had any
occasion to consider and ratify the merits of the positions taken. Second is
the frequent association of publication rules with questions of enforcement
policy. Decisions about the allocation of agency resources and effortviz., what concentration of an inevitable carcinogen in corn should lead
agency inspectors to condemn a shipment as contaminated-are among the
most frequent subjects of publication rules. Given the mischief secondary
disputes about why an agency is doing this, rather than that, could wreak,
the Supreme Court has said, judgments of that character are presumptively
unreviewable.4 5 Agency resources are already scarce, inevitably requiring
such allocations. Permitting judicial review of them consumes more of
those resources and may delay other work.
Considerations like these animated Judge Leventhal's decision in
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council, already briefly
discussed.46 He concluded that the advisory letters in that case were
interpretative rules. The question he had to decide was whether the letter
before him was "final agency action" ripe for review. On the one hand, it
was important not to "discourage the practice of giving such opinions, with
a net loss of far greater proportions to the average citizen than any possible
gain which could accrue ' 7 through making all such advice reviewable; on
the other hand, the 10,000 signed by the administrator and "published" had
a prominence that lay within the agency's control; they were adopted at the
highest levels in the agency, and the possibilities for private enforcement of
the act practically bound the inquirer and others to pay attention to their
terms. Unless the agency credibly branded its advice as "tentative," then,
advice given at the agency's head-that is, the 10,000 letters she signedwould qualify as "final agency action" subject to judicial review.
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council remains one of the
more thoughtful and balanced opinions written on the tensions animating
publication rules questions. It is one of the very few to explore the
dimensions of the practice and the practical consequences of that practice,
not only for the party who may be complaining in a particular case, but also
for the public generally in its dealings with the agency. The D.C. Circuit's
very recent opinion in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,48 though less
temperate or understanding in its diction about the practice, 49 reaches the
45. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1970); see also Thomas, supra note
11, at 142; Titolo, supra note 11, at 16.
46. See 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also supra text accompanying note 6.
47. Nat 'IAutomatic Landry & Cleaning Council, 443 F.2d at 699.

48. 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
49. See infra, note 86.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

[53:3

same result on the question of finality and ripeness, under factual
circumstances that seem comparable. The EPA's publication rule in that
case, produced in the upper echelons of the agency, spoke to state
authorities; it could be expected to make them act in ways that would have
expensive impacts on private industry, yet could not realistically be
challenged at a later stage.
[W~hatever EPA may think of its Guidance generally, the elements... petitioners
challenge consist of the agency's settled position, a position it plans to follow in
reviewing State-issued permits, a position it will insist State and local authorities
comply with in setting the terms and conditions of permits issued to petitioners, a
position EPA officials in the field are bound to apply. "5 Neither temporary nor
interlocutory, the publication rule "reflect[s] a settled agency position which has legal
and for
consequences both for State agencies administering their permit programs
5
companies... who must obtain Title V permits in order to keep operating.

Balanced against the risks that permitting review inevitably raises-the
risks animating Justice Fortas' dissent in Abbott Laboratoriesand, in some
cases, those of Heckler v. Chaney 2 as well-are two factors that, if both
are strongly present, warrant review nonetheless. The first is demonstrable
and important concrete impact on private behavior. If citizens facing
firmly held agency views are likely to modify their conduct in ways
expensive to them rather than face the consequences of having those views
applied to them, as in Abbott, review will be available only in conjunction
with the agency's adoption of its publication rule. Our system's general
commitment to the justice of providing avenues of declaratory judicial
relief in such circumstances supports a similar conclusion here. The
second factor might be described as agency control. Reviewability is, in
effect, a price the agency pays for giving prominence and concreteness to
its publication rules. When a central agency office publishes notice that it
is considering a matter and, after some exchanges with affected parties,
then publishes its conclusions under the imprimatur of high officials and
with indications that it expects to hold the public to its policy, the argument
for review is strong; so also when it chooses 10,000 of 750,000 letters of
advice to receive the administrator's signature. When advice emerges from
lower staff echelons, when-even if published-the public can be expected
to realize that top agency levels have not yet fully considered the matter, or
when the publication rule itself is framed in a manner that indicates that
issues remain open and administrative avenues remain available to pursue
them, then one cannot conclude that agency action is final. Permitting
review in such circumstances would threaten both a diversion of agency
50. AppalachianPower Co., 208 F.3d at 1022.
51. Id. at 1023.
52. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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resources, perhaps into forcing final judgment about this question at a time
when other issues have more important claims on agency resources, and
work to discourage the practice of providing guidance at all. If the agency
can in effect be given control over whether review is available or not, by
having that question turn on its signals, this question of discouragement
should be substantially resolved."
In Hudson v. FAA, 54 the D.C. Circuit faced a challenge to the FAA's
changed policy for applying a regulation setting a safety standard for air
frames. The standard required manufacturers to show that, for planes of a
certain size, all passengers could be evacuated through emergency exits
within ninety seconds. It further provided that "[compliance] with this
requirement must be shown by actual demonstration . . . unless the
Administrator finds that a combination of analysis and testing will provide
[equivalent data] ... "55 Published FAA guidance about this standard had,
for about twenty years, required retesting of changed designs through
actual demonstration if the change enlarged passenger capacity by more
than five percent. In 1998, following a study prompted by reports of
injuries occurring during retesting, the agency issued new guidance
dropping the five percent threshold and making the adequacy of analytic
data a question in each case. The guidance document also announced the
FAA's confidence that for two particular airframe expansions, for which
approval was then being sought, "a wealth of full-scale evacuation data are
available," and thus, "conduct[ing] . . . additional full-scale evacuation
demonstrations is not required to demonstrate compliance, if a satisfactory
analysis is produced."56 In what the panel characterized as "a rather
unorthodox manner," but one that in the writer's experience is often
employed and commenters have strongly urged," the FAA sought public
comment on this change. Eventually, it found the air frames in question in
compliance with its evacuation standard, on the basis only of data and
analysis; and various persons who expected to have to travel in these planes
then sought review, asserting, inter alia, that the five percent threshold
53. The argument here is quite different from Justice Scalia's argument in dissent in
United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2188 n.6 (2001), that the dignity of
challenged publication rules could be determined by an agency's litigating judgments made
after judicial review has been sought. Justice Scalia, ordinarily one of the Court's stronger
proponents of ripeness constraints when review of executive action is sought, e.g. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), presumably did not have these considerations in
mind when constructing his argument See infra note 61.
54. 192 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
55. Id. at 1033.
56. Id.
57. Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and
Policy Statements, 75 MiCH. L. REv. 520, 578-84 (1977).
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could be dropped only by a notice-and-comment regulation.
By characterizing the guidance document as a "general policy
statement" rather than an interpretive rule, the panel avoided circuit
precedent requiring the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking to change
an established interpretation; 58 and on the substance of the matter, it found
the guidance adequately supported. Before reaching these questions,
however, it had to consider whether review had been timely sought, since
petitioners had awaited and challenged concrete application of the guidance
rather than seeking review within sixty days of its issuance (as they would
apparently have been obliged to do if asserting the procedural insufficiency
of a regulation). Thus, it appears that the government was arguing that this
guidance document had constituted final agency action ripe for immediate
review. While one understands that lawyers are prone to argue whatever
makes it more likely their client will prevail, the government seems more
likely, usually, to argue against the finality and/or ripeness of publication
rules. The panel easily found that, given the announcement in the guidance
document of the pending approval proceedings in which the new approach
might be applied, "we would likely have regarded petitioner's APA
challenge as premature if it had been brought before the issuance of the
certificate, and so we do not agree that petitioners' subsequent challenge is
too late."'59 Implicit in the whole discussion, however, is that for
publication rules unmistakably representing an agency's considered view
and directly affecting citizen interests, the proper issue will much more
often be ripeness than finality.
III. CHEVRON OBEDIENCE AND SKIDMORE WEIGHT
60
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Christensen v. Harris County
and its very recent decision in United States v. Mead Corp.61 have focused
attention on how one might articulate the way in which agency judgments
on matters of law or policy should influence reviewing courts. Putting
aside the possibility of treating agency views as simply irrelevant, two
models live in the cases. The first might be described as "obedience"courts encountering agency decisions they conclude the agencies were

58. See supra note 12.
59. Hudson, 192 F.3d at 1035.
60. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
61. 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001). This paper had entered the final stages of editing when the
Mead Corp. decision was announced. The author hopes for the reader's indulgence
concerning the perils of instant analysis. He believes the opinion generally consistent with
the analysis developed here-in particular, the importance of the model of precedentalthough it leaves more scope for requiring Chevron obedience to agency judgements not
made pursuant to public procedures than he would find comfortable,
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authorized to take must accept the conclusions they embody rather than
displace them with their own independent judgment on the matter. The
second, as "weight"--the court is responsible for decision of a matter; but,
in so deciding it will treat the agency views as constituent elements of its
own decision, as persuasive if not controlling material whose force derives
from the agency's office and the dignity of its action. The "obedience"
model is firmly associated in the Court's canon with its decision in
Chevron US.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council52 that, within
the possibilities of meaning a statute's language could be given, a matter
for the courts to decide, a reviewing court must accept any reasonable
interpretation given that language by the agency Congress has empowered
to implement the statute. The "weight" model was best articulated by
Justice Jackson in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.;63 this was private litigation to
enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, in which the authority of interpretive
advice given by the Administrator of the relevant division in the U.S.
Department of Labor had been invoked:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under
this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors
64
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.

Christensen, which arose in precisely the same context as Skidmore, held
that Skidmore weight rather than Chevron obedience remained the correct
measure of the force of an agency upon judicial interpretation of text,
65
where the agency interpretation was expressed in a publication rule.
Mead Corp., which concerned a Customs Service tariff classification
ruling, reiterated the point, with rather more (and more satisfactory)
attention to the nature of that weight and its influence on judicial
judgment.66
The tendency of government lawyers to argue for more than perhaps
they advisedly should may be nowhere more evident than in their
arguments, especially post-Chevron, that publication rules have the same
authority for reviewing courts as do statutes or regulations interpreting
statutes-that once a court has found a publication rule authorized, it is
bound to accept it. Section 552(a)(2), however, suggests a different way of
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
Id. at 140.
See Christensen,529 U.S. at 587-88.
See 121 S. Ct. at 2168, 2175-76.
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understanding the force of publication rules. It treats agencies as permitted
to give publication rules in any form the force of precedent, rather than
statute.67 It does so in two ways. First, it lists them together with agency
precedent, as if each of them had equal dignity. Second, it describes the
permitted effect the agency may give its published precedents or
interpretive rules, policy statements, manuals, and the like in a way that
sounds like the treatment of precedent: "A final order, opinion, statement of
policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member
of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency
against a party other than an agency only if'6 8 it has been published as the
statute provides, or the party had actual and timely notice of it. The
question for exploration here, in my judgment, is whether it is possible to
distinguish this permitted precedential effect-permission to the agency to
rely on its published position to the disadvantage of a party-from what we

mean when we say that an agency judgment "binds" a private party, or a
court.
The analysis here is in fundamental agreement with a principal element
in the scholarship of Professor Robert Anthony, if not with his particular
analysis.6 9 He started his scholarship on this subject thirteen years ago with
Chevron, whose fundamental proposition is that, on some issues and within
the zone of reasonableness, courts are significantly bound by---obliged to
67. As William Funk and Todd Rakoff have pointed out to me, permission to rely on
publication rules is given by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), for those that are published in the Federal
Register, as well as by section 552(a)(2), for those that are otherwise published and indexed.
The 552(a)(1) formulation does not, in terms, use the idea of precedent. Nonetheless,
"precedent" remains an evocative way to describe the middle ground between legislative
force, which regulations enjoy, and a total absence of jural force. The text of section
552(a)(I), it may be observed, refutes the D.C. Circuit's suggestion, in American Mining
Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
that the simple fact that "the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal
Regulations" can be taken to demonstrate that a rule is a legislative, not an interpretive rule.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
69. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1311 (1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Interpretive Rules]; Anthony, Lifting the Smog,
supra note 37; Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just
Don't Get It, 10 ADmni. L.J. Am.U. 1 (1996); Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which
Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REv.(forthcoming Dec. 2001); Robert
A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit, Don't You?" Agency Efforts to Make
Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 31 (1992); Robert A.
Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 1 (1990); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Get Judicial
Deference?- A PreliminaryInquiry, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 121 (1988) [hereinafter Anthony,
Agency Interpretations);Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla, Pro-Ossification:A
HarderLook at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 667 (1996).
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accept without the possibility of revising-agency judgments about legal
issues that statutory language leaves open.70 Professor Ronald Levin's
recent work has persuasively shown that one necessary condition of such
judgments is that they be able to survive Overton Park/State Farm
review. 71 Another necessary condition, and this is Professor Anthony's
assertion, is that they be the product of a delegated lawmaking processwhether formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. If they
constitute, simply, interpretive rules or statements of general policy, or a
course of precedent developed through informal means, then-here we are
at Christensen-a reviewing court may find it appropriate to give them
some weight but should not say that it was "bound" by the agency's view.
Whatever judgment is exercised, that is, is the reviewing court's
judgment-informed to whatever extent the circumstances warrant by the
72
agency's developed view.
Putting it this way should suggest that what is being invoked is the
common-law model of balancing.
"Weight," like "balancing,"
metaphorically suggests the scales of justice, but few pretend to any very
precise account of what goes on those scales. One has "more" or "less,"
rather than "5" or "8.2." Discussions of common-law technique for dealing
with analogy, or evaluating the law of different (but perhaps influential)
jurisdictions produce evocative formulations. Justice Frankfurter argued in
a variety of contexts that the absence of "a calculus of value, ' 73 "talismanic
words,"'7 4 or "a table of logarithms" 7 did not preclude but rather
characterized judicial judgment. "It cannot br too often repeated that
judges are not automata. The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any
standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant
play of an informed professional critique upon its work."76 Justice
Jackson's Skidmore formulation self-evidently draws on the same

70. See Anthony, Agency Interpretations,supranote 69, at 121-22.
71. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHi.KENT L. REv. 1253, 1286 (1997).
72. Mead Corp. substantially adopts this analysis but-presumably out of the wish to
avoid overruling precedents that had not discussed the point--reserves the possibility of
"reasons for Chevron deference even when no [procedural] administrative formality was
required and none was afforded." 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2173 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A.
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57, 263 (1995)); compare 121 S. Ct. at
2184 n.4, with id.at 2186 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
74. Id at 489.
75. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading ofStatutes,47 CoLuM. L. REv.
527, 543 (1947).
76. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 489.
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77

traditions.
Staying for the moment with the court model, we can observe that what
we mean when we say a judicial judgment or rule is "binding" varies
considerably with the subject of our inquiry.78 When we say precedents are
binding on lower tribunals, we mean that the lower tribunals are powerless
to revise them and subject to summary reversal for ignoring them; in a
hierarchical system of courts, under a rule of stare decisis, lower tribunals
are without discretion to depart from the norms previously announced by
superior authority. 79 An analogy to Skidmore weight is what courts afford
precedents of a coordinate, inferior, or foreign jurisdiction-if and to the
extent they are persuasive, and bearing in mind the affirmative values of
uniformity and how the legislature has assigned responsibility, they will be
weighed.80 Courts in the First Department of New York's Appellate
Division will pay attention to judgments in the Second Department or the
Second Circuit, assessing their persuasiveness and coherence with other
doctrine, but they will not say that they are "bound" by them. When a
court is regarding the force of its own prior decisions, there is an
intermediate ground: the court will depart from them only to the extent the
present controversy was in fact not there decided (the cases can be
distinguished) or it can be persuaded that its earlier judgment was seriously
in error (the prior holding is overruled). While overruling is always
possible, courts will say that it commands a showing considerably stronger

77. The tone of the majority and dissent in Mead Corp. can readily be understood in
relation to authorial comfort with these traditions. Justice Souter, author of the majority,
responds to the uncertainties by remarking that "[j]udges in other, perhaps harder, cases will
make reasoned choices between the two examples [Chevron and Mead Corp. as exemplars
of obedience and weight], the way courts have always done," 121 S. Ct. at 2176 n. 18, and
characterizes the difference between the Court and Justice Scalia in these terms: "Justice
Scalia's first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court's choice has
been to tailor deference to variety." 121 S.Ct. 2176. Justice Scalia, consistently troubled
by balancing tests, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (dissent), and resistant to
the common-law functions in federal courts, Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 151920 (2001), foresees an explosion of litigation if the "discarded" Skidmore test is revivedfailing to recognize that it lived happily side by side with Chevron's predecessor, NLRB v.
HearstPublications,322 U.S. 111 (1994), for the four decades preceding Chevron.
78. See generally, Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J.LEGAL
EDuC. 431 (1989).
79. For a particularly strong statement in the context of statutory interpretation, see
Neal v. UnitedStates, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).

80. 1 owe to John Manning the suggestion to compare Salve Regina College v.Russell,
499 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1991) (discussing the basis, in an Erie context, for courts of appeals
to respect the knowledgeable views of district judges about the law of the states from which
they are appointed).
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than may have elicited the initial conclusion. 8'
Whether administrative agencies will think themselves "bound," or will
be thought by subsequent reviewing courts to have been "bound" by
judicial decisions is a more complex question we know as the
"nonacquiescence" question. When the agency has to know that the
particular matter before it will come to the same appellate tribunal as has
previously spoken, most thoughtful observers-and certainly that
tribunal-can be expected to say that it is "bound." Yet even this case is
somewhat controversial.8 2 When the reviewing court might be one that has
not yet spoken, the prevailing rule is that the agency is not bound, although
it would be well advised to explain its reasons for refusing to accept the
previous judicial instruction it received.
Now, still in the court context, how would we talk about the impact of
precedent on the parties to litigation? Within the case-res judicata, the
law of the case-the parties to that litigation are bound in the strong sense:
judgments must be paid and contempt citations are possible. In some
circumstances, we would expect courts to declare a party collaterally
estopped from asserting in one litigation a proposition it had lost in another.
On the whole, this is a proposition about disputed facts, not law. For
agencies, moreover, it is essentially subsumed into the nonacquiescence
issue; collateral estoppel, as estoppel generally, is not a powerful idea.
In the stare decisis context, courts have occasionally voiced the idea that
a precedent once established is binding even on those who were not parties
to its generation; but what they seem to have meant is that the parties ought
to have a high degree of confidence that the courts themselves will follow
precedent, under the discipline of stare decisis, not that negative
consequences (like contempt of court citations) could flow from the very
fact of an attempt to contest it. In a theoretical sense, it is always possible
to argue for the distinguishing or overruling of precedent in the court that
set it. One can find in the literature elegant discussions of how long such
efforts can properly endure before private litigants should understand that
the effort is fruitless and that respect for the system of law requires that
they simply comply. Even these discussions, however, suggest no
independent penalty that would attach to a failure to accept the precedent-

81. For courts like the federal courts of appeal, which sit in panels, the question of
overruling established circuit law is generally reserved to the court sitting en banc under its
rules of practice.
82. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989); Mathew Diller & Nacy Morawetz,
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to
Estreicherand Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
The Uneasy Case Against IntracircuitNonacquiescence:A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990).
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as one would, say, to the violation of a criminal statute-just a strong
signal to parties and the lower courts that resistance is unlikely to be
fruitful. They should be completely confident, that is, that the prior
precedents will be the law applied to their cases even though, in theory, the
opportunity of attempting a distinction or seeking an overruling is open to
them. One might note, moreover, that this argument is weaker if one is
speaking of agency rather than judicial precedent; considerations of
protecting justified reliance interests aside, we generally expect and indeed
approve fluidity of policy development in the agency context. Thus, one
could expect agencies to assert considerably greater freedom of revision
than courts think proper in their own practice.
What seems important to note here is that these ideas of legal obligation
are a great deal more nuanced than we generally encounter in the statutory
context. Statutes, if valid, are indisputable; and serious consequences
attach directly to their violation. One can argue whether they are
applicable or not; but the adjudicatory forum is not a place where you can
argue for their revision. That can only happen if the legislature again acts
in the constitutionally prescribed manner. Regulations adopted following
statutorily commanded procedures are treated in just the same way. While
courts entertain disputes about the validity of such regulations much more
readily than they do for statutes, and with much more intrusive inquiry, a
valid regulation is equally indisputable. It binds court, agency, and private
actors alike, and revision can happen only through further rulemaking.
Serious consequences may attach directly to its violation.
From a certain perspective this is a stunning result, since it means the
courts will accord to valid executive action the same ultimate authority
over their judgment as they do to valid legislative action. We are
accustomed to thinking of judicial review as having much more purchase
over executive action than legislative. But on further reflection, it ought
not be so surprising. Where the greater control of executive action is
exercised is in determining its validity. Here we return to the ways in
which Professors Levin and Anthony understand Chevron. If the
rulemaker has been authorized to act and has acted within the parameters of
its authority-the courts determine these questions, and even under
Chevron they do so with a lot more attention than they pay to the
corresponding questions for statutes-then we have the valid action of a
coordinate branch. Why should it, any more than the authorized act of the
legislature, be open to judicial revision? The judges are bound. So, we
might note, are all agency officials and citizens. Even before the agency,
citizens might seek a waiver or they might seek an interpretation; but what
they cannot seek, unless in a fresh rulemaking proceeding, is a revision.
They, as the agency, and as the court, are bound.
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For interpretive rules, statements of general policy and the like, on the
other hand, that APA section 552 adopts the model of precedent. The
agency may rely on these publications, which is not quite the same as
saying it is entitled to treat them as binding on the public. For reviewing
courts, Christensen and Mead Corp. tell us, echoing Skidmore, the
conclusion is the same. The court exercises its own judgment, informed in
doing so by the conclusions the agency has reached. What about lower
tiers of authority within the agency-are they bound by the agency's
instructions? The model of precedent here suggests a different kind of
response; if the source of the published advice or instruction is
hierarchically superior, one could suppose an agency inspector to be in just
the same position as a trial judge reading an appellate opinion. She is
professionally obliged to obey. Such expectations are reflected, for
example, in the instructions the Customs Service was noted to have given
its own staff concerning rulings like those at issue in Mead Corp.; a ruling
letter, the Court observed, "represents the official position of the Customs
Service with respect to the particular transaction or issue described therein
and is binding on all Customs Service personnel . . .until modified or
revoked. 8 3 If we approach these difficult questions from the model of
"precedent" rather than "statute," then, in my judgment we may be able to
make some helpful progress in understanding.
When Hoctor was cited for violation, because he kept his tigers behind
only a six-foot fence, the formal state of affairs was that the agency had to
demonstrate that he had not provided the "structurally sound" containment
its regulations validly required. On a precedential model, we might say
that the fact that the agency had told its inspectors to accept eight-foot
fences as complying with this standard could be taken to establish, prima
facie, that his six-foot fence was a violation-but that would be a prima
facie showing only, and the issue would remain whether Hoctor was in
violation of the "structurally sound" containment requirement. The case is
no different than if, in some prior adjudication to which Hoctor was not a
party and in which another game park owner appeared without effective
counsel, the age'ncy had found that six feet was inadequate, and eight feet
was required. Hoctor gets to show that, in his case, six feet was enough; or,
to challenge the prior outcome. Of course this may be costly and difficult
to do; for most game park owners, as for most builders of nuclear power
plants, the most cost-effective route may be to go along with what the staff
has identified as a priori acceptable. In this way, the practical effect of the
staff position may be quite substantial. Still it is the standard of structural
soundness that must be satisfied; "eight feet" is no better than a provisional
83.

121 S. Ct. at 2168 (emphasis added) (quoting 19 C.F.R. §177.9(a) (2000)).
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definition of what will meet it, and Hoctor should be free to follow his
preferences if he has the confidence of his design.
Note, on this account, that someone may be bound-not Hoctor, but the
agency inspectorate, those who are down the chain of command from the
office issuing this interpretation-policy-guidance.
Hoctor is being
somewhat disadvantaged, to be sure; assuming section 552(a) has been
complied with, the agency may rely on its definition in meeting its burden

about structurally sound containment. But if Hoctor, in fact, has an eightfoot fence, well built and appropriately distant from overhangs, we might
expect not just that the agency's staff will not, but that it cannot,84 seek to

fine him for violating the regulation requiring a structure that is sound for
containment purposes until the agency changes its advice-a change it will
need to justify. Hoctor could complain if an inspector ignored the advice
she found in the agency's manuals, and that inspector might well find
herself the subject of employment discipline. Understanding these effects
of interpretive rules and manuals helps us to see why publicity for these
documents is so avidly sought, and why it is that private actors are also
assiduous to show that an agency in fact has some such internal "law,"
which has been departed from in their case.8 5 As Judge Posner recognized,
Every governmental agency that enforces a less than crystalline statute must interpret
the statute, and it does the public a favor if it announces the interpretation in advance
of enforcement, whether the announcement takes the form of a rule or of a policy
statement, which the Administrative Procedure Act assimilates to an interpretive rule.
It would be no favor to the public to discourage the announcement of agencies'
86
interpretations by burdening the interpretive process with cumbersome formalities.

84. The case is perhaps different for inspectors' manuals, as for a district attorney's
manuals for police and prosecutors. See Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (Burger, J., concurring and Bazelon, J., dissenting).
85. For an example of a court unselfconsciously treating a publication rule as binding
upon the government, see Anastasoffv. UnitedStates, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000).
Facing a conflict in holding between two circuits on an issue of tax law, the government had
published "a document styled Action on Decision" announcing its acquiescence in the
taxpayer-favoring outcome. This publication rule led an en banc panel of the Eighth Circuit
to vacate the government-favoring outcome one of its panels had reached as moot-an
outcome defensible only on the understanding that the government had in some respect
bound itself by issuing the document.
86. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996). Compare with
this formulation Judge Randolph's disapproving characterization in the AppalachianPower
case:
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded
statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended
phrases, ambiguous standards and the like.... Several words in a regulation may
spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more detail regarding
what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law is made, without notice and
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This seems particularly apt for interpretations that are primarily directed to
the agency's own staff-inspection manuals, for example-with the
motivation of securing a desirable internal consistency of action. The
interpretation in Hoctor's case was embodied in such a manual, a manual
that spoke to the inspector, not to Hoctor.
On this understanding, it would be an error for the Department to charge
Hoctor with violating its eight-foot rule. The agency has not adopted such
a rule, and that charge would mistake the legal issue to be decided at the
sanctions hearing. Of course, it may be appropriate to bear in mind the
inadequacy, the complexity, of talking about an "agency," as if it were a
seamless, anthropomorphic entity. If the inspector's complaint, that begins
an enforcement proceeding, cites Hoctor for "[f]ence for tigers six feet
high, not eight," that may be a mistake only of syntax, one encouraged by
the manual that appropriately directs her own conduct. So long as Hoctor
is permitted to show,, before the fine is assessed, that the containment he
provided was in fact structurally sound and adequate to contain his tigers (a
showing that might prove difficult if the precipitating cause of the citation
was the presence of one of his tigers in farmer Johnson's cattle yard), such
a mistake would seem not to have been prejudicial.
Judges are not always careful to observe the difference between
"binding" in precedential and legislative terms, as may be suggested by a
contrasting pair of excerpts-the first from Judge Posner's Hoctor opinion,
and the second from Judge Randolph's opinion in AppalachianPower:
Hoctor: Had the Department ... said in the internal memorandum that it could not
imagine a case in which a perimeter fence for dangerous animals that was lower than
eight feet would provide secure containment, and would therefore presume, subject to
rebuttal, that a lower fence was insecure, it would have been on stronger ground. For
it would have been tying the rule to the animating standard, that of secure
containment, rather 8 than
making it stand free of the standard, self-contained,
7
unbending, arbitrary.
Appalachian Power: If an agency acts as if a document issued at headquarters is
controlling in the field, if it treats the document in the same manner as it treats a

legislative rule, if it bases enforcement actions on the policies or interpretations
formulated in the document, if it leads private parties or State permitting authorities
to believe that it will declare permits invalid unless they comply with the terms of the

comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. With the advent of the Internet, the
agency does not need these official publications to ensure widespread circulation; it
can inform those affected simply by posting its new guidance or memoranda or
policy statement on its web site.
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
87. Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 171.
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The Department could properly hope that "a document issued at
headquarters [would be regarded by its staff as] controlling in the field" 89-'
that is why it is issued. Similarly, it will hope that-and the public will be
best served if-its staff "bases enforcement actions on the policies or
interpretations formulated in the document." 9 And an agency that is
reliable in its advice will inevitably "leado] private parties or State
permitting authorities to believe that it will declare permits invalid unless
they comply with the terms of the document."91 None of these treatments
of a publication rule entail the conclusion that it has "treat[ed] the
document in the same manner as ... a legislative rule." 92 That requires a
further step.
In Hoctor, the Department had taken that step. It compounded its
internal error by arguing to the courts as if they, too, were constrained by
the agency's approach.
The only ground on which the Department defends sanctioning Hoctor for not having
a high enough fence is that requiring an eight-foot-high perimeter fence for dangerous
animals is an interpretation of the Department's own structural-strength regulation,
and "provided an agency's interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the
Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given 'controlling
weight unless it is
93
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."

The Department, thus, appeared to be arguing that its interpretation, qua
interpretation, bound both Hoctor and, in a sense arguably even stronger
than Chevron,94 the court
The Stinson case, on which the Department relied, is yet another
outcropping of the proposition that an agency's interpretation of its own
rules has "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation" 9 3 -that "a reviewing court must accept a 'plausible
construction of the.., regulation' even if it is not 'the best or most natural

88. Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1021 (emphasis added) (citing Anthony,
InterpretiveRules, supra note 69, at 1328-29).

89. Id.
90. id.
91.

Id.

92. Id.
93. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Stinson
v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-46 (1993)).

94. Stinson review does not appear to include the consideration of agency
reasonableness--the Overton Park and State Farm issues-that is an element of Chevron's
notorious second step.
95. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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one by grammatical or other standards."' 96 In his remarkable first work,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Rules, 97 my
colleague, John Manning, forcefully suggested a constitutional basis,
grounded in separation of powers considerations, for concluding that the
proper deference model for agency self-interpretations that are not in
themselves the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority ought rather to
be the Skidmore model. 98 An increasingly rich literature, unnecessary to
imitate here, has pointed in similar directions in recent years;99 and
perhaps, as Professor Richard Pierce has suggested, Christensen will be
found to open the door to such a reconsideration.i1u Although the last few
lines of Christensen indicate that agency interpretations of their own rules
may still be regarded as controlling if textually available, Manning's
arguments were not considered there; and it is becoming increasingly
evident how much mischief the D.C. Circuit is being led into, in
understandably squirming to avoid this particular hook." °
As Professor Anthony has long argued, and the Supreme Court in Mead
Corp. has now indicated will ordinarily be the case, an agency ought not be
able to claim for its interpretation the capacity to overcome judicial
judgment about its authority unless it has used the procedures for
lawmaking to adopt it. As made here, this argument is based simply on the
diction of section 552 and the understanding it suggests, responsive to the
levels of formality involved, of the difference in effect between publication
rules and regulations. Publication rules may be binding within an agency
hierarchy, as precedents are binding on the lower tribunals of a judicial
system; but "influence" seems the better account to give of their permitted
Stinson or Chevron obedience, is
force over others. Skidmore weight,0 not
2
deploy.
to
judges
for
model
the right

96. Manning, supra note 33, at 613 (quoting Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105
(1971) and Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991)) (referring to Udall
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
97. Manning, supra note 33.
98. Id. at 689-90.
99. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC
No-Action Letters: CurrentProblemsand a ProposedFramework, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 921
(1998); see also Rakoff, supra note 14; Jonathan T. Molot, The JudicialPerspective in the
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with The Judiciary's
StructuralRole, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2000).

100. Cf Pierce, supra note 12, at 574. The bulk of the Christensen discussion, however,
concerned the agency's interpretation of a statute, not an agency rule.
101. See id. See also Kieran Ringgenberg, Comment, United States v. Chrysler: The
Conflict Between Fair Warning and Adjudicative Retroactivity in D.C. Circuit
Administrative Law, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 914 (1999).
102. See Manning, supra note 33, at 690.
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The Mead Corp. Court's recent account of Skidmore weight, it might be
added, is not empty, albeit it leaves the judge with more responsibility for
decision than the alternatives. The Court pointedly invoked Justice
Jackson's formulation in that case, that the judge's obligation is to accord
the agency's view the weight properly owing "a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance," taking into account "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.' 0 3 Respect for the agency's view,
given its responsibilities and knowledge, is commanded by good
administration; rejection of the considered view of an agency "made in
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case" should be "justified by very good reasons."' 10 4
This explication is a notable improvement on Justice Thomas's opinion
in Christensen, which readers might fairly think gave little more than lip
service to Skidmore. Like both Skidmore and NationalAutomatic Laundry
and Cleaning Council, Christensen had presented a question of meaning
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, on which the Administrator had
expressed a view in a manner reflecting relatively careful consideration.1'0
Yet Justice Thomas's opinion never considered the Administrator's view as
if it had "weight" owing to its being the view of an official to whom
Congress had given responsibility and who had a superior ability to assess
the importance of the issue raised to the overall program. Rather, he
presented the statutory question as argued by the advocates before the
Court, characterized the government's arguments as "unpersuasive," and
showed how he believed the statutory question should be resolved. Only
then did he turn to the question of the Department's opinion letter, and after
explaining why Skidmore weight rather than Chevron obedience is the
proper model, his full discussion was this: "As explained above, we find
unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the statute at issue in this
case."' 1 6 Justice Jackson's factors and considerations nowhere appear. In
Mead Corp. they were examined in some length, and the case was
remanded to the Federal Circuit with instructions to reconsider the appeal

103.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

104.

Id. at 139-40.

105. The letter in Christensenwas signed by the Acting Administrator of the Division
and published. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 581 (2000). See supra text
accompanying note 47.
106. Christensen,529 U.S. at 587.
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10 7
in their light.
The familiar judicial contrast between giving an agency's reasoning and
judgment weight and according it controlling force is implicit in Chevron
itself. Step one of the Chevron analysis requires the court to delineate for
itself, to the extent it can, the judgments Congress has made, using
"traditional tools of statutory construction."' 0 8 Then, having decided for
itself what the statute could mean, with the responsibility to reject
"administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent"l °9-that is, outside this judicially delineated range of possible
meaning-the court is obliged to accept reasonable agency constructions
that are within the range of possibilities it has independently found. This
second step, the one that has attracted so much attention in the literature, is
the step at which Chevron obedience is called for. But the Court has long
described the "traditional tools of statutory construction""
to be
independently deployed by the courts at step one to include consideration
of agency interpretations. "The interpretation of the meaning of statutes,"
the Court sixty years ago confirmed in United States v. American Trucking
Ass'ns, " is "exclusively a judicial function."' " 2 Yet, the Court later
observed in the same opinion,

In any case [in which questions of statutory construction arise that have also been
confronted by an agency responsible for administration of the statute in question, its]
interpretations are entitled to great weight. This is particularly true here where the
interpretations involve "contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men
charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts
work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Furthermore, the
[agency's] interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact
3 that it was the
[agency] which suggested the provisions' enactment to Congress."

107. See 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2177 (2001).
108. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
109. Id. This way of putting the Chevron proposition was recently confirmed in
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001), where the Court thus summarized
its statutory reading: "We conclude, however, that the agency's interpretation goes beyond
the limits of what is ambiguous, and contradicts what in our view is quite clear." Id. at 916.
That is, the step one question is whether the agency has attached to the statute a meaning it
cannot bear, not (as it is too often put) whether the statute precisely resolves the question.
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
111. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
112. Id. at544.
113. Id. at 549 (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933)). See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (per L. Hand, J.)
(purporting that testimony at hearing by government official does not control interpretation,
but supports it); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (explaining NLRB
is not an appellate tribunal in relation to hearing officer's conclusions, but nonetheless those
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"Weight" means that these are factors to be worked into the analysis
alongside other traditional tools, such as independent reading of the text.
The unmistakably judicial task of limning the statute's possible meaning is
incorrectly performed if they are not considered-just as it would be
incorrectly performed if the text, or coordinate statutes, or other "traditional
tools" were not considered. It is precisely here that, in practice, the
majority opinion in Christensen failed to deliver on its Skidmore promise.
It treated the agency's view of its authority as if it were merely the
argument of an advocate's brief, and not vital evidence of meaning that
should inform its own decision.
Justice Scalia, concurring in Christensen and dissenting in Mead Corp.,
has been a lonely critic of the revival of attention to Skidmore. Chevron
did not discuss Skidmore, or present itself as working a dramatic change in
the nature of judicial review of administrative action-although the
literature has certainly given it the latter characteristics, one can understand
it as no more that a generalization of the Court's long-standing Hearst
doctrine. 14 Nonetheless, as he argued, Chevron's rationale was not limited
to the context of regulations, and subsequent holdings had applied Chevron
to a variety of "authoritative agency positions" that were not the product
either of notice-and-comment rulemaking or of formal agency adjudication.
Chevron, therefore, had displaced Skidmore. Although at times, Justice
Scalia has seemed to enjoy playing the bull in the administrative law china
shop,' 15 here he accused his colleagues of working "an avulsive change in
conclusions have weight in the record on the basis of which its judgment is to be reviewed).
114. See supra note 77. See Peter L. Strauss, One HundredFifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1120-21 (1987).
115. Thus, in Allentown Mack Sery. and Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376-79
(1998), he blithely overlooked halfa century's understanding that the Court would not itself
perform substantial evidence review. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491
(1951). In Assoc. of Data ProcessingServ. Orgs. v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 745 F.2d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984), an opinion he wrote while sitting on
the D.C. Circuit, again ignoring the Supreme Court's expressed understanding, he denied
any possibility that judicial review of agency fact-finding under the APA's "substantial
evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards invoked differing standards.
Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. holds that the "substantial evidence" review
standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) for on-the-record proceedings, and the "arbitrary and
capricious" review standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) are equivalent. Id. at 683-84. While it
is certainly true that neither formula "furnish[es] a calculus of value by which a reviewing
court can assess the evidence," Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488
(1951), one could observe the same about many formulas evoking the process of judicial
judgment. Courts have long known how to differentiate "preponderance of the evidence"
from "beyond a reasonable doubt." So, one might have thought, here. "[A] standard leaving
an unavoidable margin for individual judgment does not leave the judicial judgment at large
even though the phrasing of the standard does not wholly fence it in." Id. at 489.
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16
judicial review of federal administrative action."'
It is remarkable to find a Justice who in the past has been attentive to
arguments about the precise basis of agency power' 17 so accepting of the
proposition that agency actions not constituting an exercise of delegated
procedural authority could so restrict judicial decision."$ As he clearly
regards such actions as the exercise of executive authority," 9 his view may
be grounded in the expansive visions of presidential authority (and
hesitations about judicial authority) he has voiced in other contexts. 20 Yet
it is striking that decisional responsibility in Christensen inevitably lay in
the courts; as had been the case in Skidmore, this was litigation between
"private" parties (one of them a county) about their rights and duties under
federal law; the federal administrator, who had not purported to act in any
other than an advisory capacity, had no formal role in this dispute and was
not a party to it.
The driving practical concern underlying Justice Scalia's resistance to
Skidmore appears to lie in what he understands to be the static quality of
statutes as the judiciary encounter them. Under Skidmore, the court-not
the agency-is saying what the statute means (even if with the agency's
assistance). If a court is to assign meaning to a statute, that meaning then
becomes fixed. Consequently, "the majority's approach will lead to the
ossification of large portions of our statutory law."' 2' Chevron leaves
revison of meaning "within the control of the Executive Branch for the
future. Once the Court has spoken [in a Skidmore analysis] it becomes
unlawful for the agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now
says what the court has prescribed."' 22 Separation of powers principles
preclude judicial acceptance that their judgments are open to revisions by
the executive; 23 the Court has been emphatic that its statutory readings

116. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2177 (2001).
117. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stressing the importance of judicial attention to authority given the failures of the
delegation doctrine).
118. Compare the works of Robert Anthony, supranote 69 and accompanying text.
119. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 121 S. Ct.
903, 911-14 (2001), characterizing as executive, not legislative, power the EPA's
challenged authority to adopt regulations in that case. Compare the separate opinions of
Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens with Justice Souter on precisely this point. Id. at 91921. Afortiori, giving guidance must be an executive activity.
120. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 604 (1992).
121. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 2181.
122. Id.at2182.
123. See id. (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
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may be revised only by Congress.' 24 "What the courts says is the law after
according Skidmore deference will be the law forever,
beyond the power of
125
the agency to change even through rulemaking."'
While this appears to be a powerful argument, its validity is limited to
judgments of the Supreme Court; the judgment of a court of appeals, and
certainly the judgment of a district court on some technical matter, does not
12 6
render it "unlawful for the agency to take a contradictory position."'
Moreover, the proposition that texts once adopted (and interpreted) acquire
a meaning that cannot change with time is not engraved in the Constitution,
as Justice Scalia himself commendably recognized just days before the
decision in Mead Corp. 27 Finally, the analysis offered here goes only to
the issue of authority-whether a publication rule is ultra vires the agency's
statutory and regulation framework, and not whether it constitutes sound
policy. The impulse underlying the formulations in Seminole Rock,
Stinson, and the like is the defense of agencies from judicial intrusions into
the policy arena-an impulse that pervades the judicial oeuvre on judicial
review, as in Chevron itself. Whether an agency has authority to act is not,
in itself, a question of policy; careful attention to the question of authority,
then, does not preclude accepting an agency's initiative within the arena in
which its authority is secure. 28 Authority having been found, the judicial
respect for agency responsibility taught by Seminole Rock and Stinson can
take full hold.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY FOR PUBLICATION RULES
That an administrative agency must have authority to act in a manner
adversely affecting private interests is a central proposition of American
administrative law. 129
Giving Skidmore weight to an agency's
determination that its constitutive statutes and regulations authorize a
publication rule is an element of analyzing the authority question;
nonetheless, the inquiry-like Chevron's first step-is an independent one.
A number of considerations suggest, as well, that it be seriously
undertaken, in particular that courts need not hesitate so much as they
124. See id (citing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996)).
125. Id. at2183.
126. Id. at2182.
127. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001).
128. Thus, in Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1999), once the Court
had concluded that the FAA's publication rule was authorized, it characterized its standard
of review for the reasonableness of that rule as less demanding than would have attended a
regulation, given its informality. See supra text following note 44; see also Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001).
129. See Rakoff, supra note 14, at 161.
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would with statutory text to find 3a0 regulation insufficiently precise to
authorize challenged agency action.1
Questions about the adequacy of statutory precision, whether described
in terms of vagueness or of delegation, are freighted with separation of
powers considerations restricting their use. For a court to review the
sufficiency of the legislative effort is both legally and politically a
hazardous enterprise. When confronting Congress's choices about the
extent to which it should legislate, and the extent to which it will leave
matters to others, the courts are, by confession, lacking in judicially
manageable standards.' 3 ' The prohibition against excessive delegation of
legislative authority, although mentioned frequently enough, is rarely
enforced.
Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that
some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left
to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate over
unconstitutional deleation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree."
For coordinate institutions sharing constitutional authority,
the Congress and the Court, this conclusion drives the resulting emptiness of the
doctrine; the courts could hardly undertake continuously to instruct Congress how
better to perform its business
133 without "expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government.

For statutes, "vagueness" is a constitutional construct as well; a
conclusion that a statute is impermissibly vague equally criticizes the
legislative effort, asserting that better work could have been done.
Accordingly, the citizen's claim to better definition than Congress has
given must be deeply grounded, and does not prevent Congress from
assigning significant responsibilities to administrative agencies.
Assuring sufficient precision in regulations is a less threatening task, and
given the existence of statutory as well as constitutional instructions, a
court has more tools at its disposal with which to perform that task.
Agencies are not constitutionally coordinate institutions with the courts,
34
nor do their actions come with the political legitimacy statutes enjoy.
The agency's statute and the general framework of its administration
provide a context within which the reasonable possibility of drafting
regulations of greater specificity can be more confidently assessed; and

130. Cf Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
131. See Whitman, 121 S.Ct. at 913.
132. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The

majority opinion is to the same effect. Id. at 372-73.
133. Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
134. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
n.9 (1983).
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there is no constitutionally grounded inhibition to making that assessment.
Congress, moreover, can only legislate; unlike an administrative agency, it
possesses no less formal means by which to generate norms significantly
influencing private conduct. For this reason, it has a motivation for
optimizing the precision of its statutes that agencies lack for their
regulations.'3 Policing the adequacy of regulations to support subsequent
publication rulemaking, then, both poses fewer institutional threats and
offers safeguards against agency abuses. "A substantive regulation must
have sufficient content and definitiveness as to be a meaningful exercise in
agency lawmaking. It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate
mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal
36
'interpretations."",1
Permitting courts to supervise the adequacy of agency's regulatory effort
is hardly without hazard. The task is unmistakably connected with agency
business, and the chance that an independent judicial reading will blunder
through incomprehension, or intrude the judiciary into what is properly the
agency's policy realm, is correspondingly increased. There is, as always,
the sometimes difficult judicial obligation to respect Congress's
assignments of responsibilities for decision. These responsibilities include
allocating the agency's finite resources in support of its effort, and judges
37
will often find it hard to identify or appreciate that resource constraint.
Particularly important, then, is that the reviewing court approach any
question about the adequacy of an agency's drafting effort-whether it has
done better than to produce "mush"-with an appreciation for the full task
the agency faced. Litigation is a poor setting in which to attempt to
understand the context in which challenged particulars have appeared to an
agency. Parties present a particular detail of the regulatory scheme that has
impinged on them. Avoiding a disproportionate response requires the court
to attempt to see the issue in the frame of the agency's time and
resources. 138 Just as procedural due process analysis must be "shaped by
the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions,"' 3 9 consideration of the
adequacy of an agency's rulemaking effort must be shaped by the effort in
general, not just some particular outcome about which complaint is later
made. In Hoctor, for example, the adequacy of the Department's
containment standard for big cats is better seen in the context of its full
135. See Manning, supranote 33, at 691-93.
136. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(citing Manning, supra note 33, at 655-57). See generally Strauss, supra note 130.
137. Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833-38 (1985).
138. Cf Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NDRC, 435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978).
139. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,344 (1976).
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complement of regulations under the Animal Welfare Act, 14 in which
common species are provided for in much more detail, than as the isolated
question, "Could the Department have done more here?" The answer to
the isolated question will always be "Yes," yet a court finding a general
effort to regulate in some detail ought more properly to understand the
resource constraints and priority choices an agency will have faced, and to
assess the adequacy of the particular regulation being challenged in that
context.
Also essential is the acceptance of "standards" rather than "rules" as an
adequate performance of the obligation to create sufficiently specific
regulations. A standard, we can note, is precisely the kind of rule that is
most familiar to, and comfortable within, the world of common-law
Issues of negligence are issues about the behavior of
precedent.
"reasonable people." An individual facing liability for some past act or
having to plan future conduct is not thought unfairly treated when her
behavior is measured against this very generalized prescription-having
attention, of course, to the detailed characteristics of her behavior in its
context, as well as to the results that have been reached in applying the
same standards to other congeries of fact. Nor is it thought unfair in any
sense, that other juries and judges in other cases have had no more precise
instructions, and that the parameters of her enforceable obligation emerge
hazily and imprecisely from their practice.
One might again invoke a common-law analogy--one that seems to
have figured in recent Court judgments in other contexts-for framing the
issue here. Referring to common-law functions of judges, and attempting
to suggest their limits, Justice Holmes once wrote:
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A commonlaw judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical
nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the
common-law rules of master
limited jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of the 141
and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.

Agencies, which do and must interpret, can be held to do so interstitially,
confined from molar to molecular motions. When the Supreme Court
rejected an FCC interpretation of statutory permission to "modify" ratefiling requirements that put in place a major deregulation, 142 and FDA
interpretations of "drug" and "device" that surprisingly extended its

140. 9 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.142. See supra text accompanying note 30.
141. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994).
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regulatory authority to tobacco and cigarettes,143 one could believe, it
followed just such an impulse. But within proper realms of interpretation,
additional procedural requirements have no place.
V. "RULES" EXPLICATING "STANDARDS"

Is it an independent problem that the inspector's manual underlying
Hoctor departed from the standard-based approach of the regulation, and
embodied a norm that we would recognize as a rule--eight feet? One can
easily understand why, either in instructing its inspectors or in creating safe
harbors for those it regulates, the Department would prefer to give exact
parameters; the impulses are, respectively, to control the discretion of a
distant employee in her dealings with the public, and to give the public the
assurance of a clear definition. Waxing jurisprudential, Judge Posner
seemed to find this shift troubling in and of itself, calling attention to the
differences between courts, developing law case-by-case through
precedent, and legislatures, and suggesting that the Department's
instructions could not properly be called interpretive.
At the other extreme from what might be called normal or routine interpretation
is the making of ... rules that are consistent with the statute or regulation under
which the rules are promulgated but not derived from it ....
There is no way to
reason to an eight-foot perimeter-fence rule as opposed to a seven-and-a-half foot
fence or a nine-foot fence or a ten-foot fence ....
The reason courts refuse to create statutes of limitations is precisely the
difficulty of reasoning to a number by the methods of reasoning used by courts.
Hemmings v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1987). One cannot extract from the
concept of a tort that a tort suit should be barred unless brought within one, or two, or
three, or five years. The choice is arbitrary and courts are uncomfortable with
making arbitrary choices. They see this as a legislative function. Legislators have
the democratic legitimacy to make choices among value judgments, choices based on
hunch or guesswork or even the toss of a coin, and other arbitrary choices. When
agencies base rules on arbitrary choices they are legislating, and so these rules are
legislative or substantive and require notice and comment rulemaking, a procedure
that is analogous to the procedure employed by legislatures in making statutes. The
notice of proposed rulemaking corresponds
to the bill and the reception of written
1
comments to the hearing on the bill. 4

But, as Judge Posner quickly recognized, this approach is unsustainable.
If it is preferable that rulemaking have the adjudicatory quality of
announcing standards rather than rules, a staffs identification of a safe
harbor in any scientific or technological matter will often have rulish

143. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).
144. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170-71 (7th Cir. 1996).
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qualities-it will set parameters that the staff have concluded meet the
agency's standards.
Even in a nontechnical area the use of a number as a rule of thumb to guide the
application of a general norm will often be legitimately interpretive. Had the
Department of Agriculture said in the internal memorandum that it could not imagine
a case in which a perimeter fence for dangerous animals that was lower than eight
feet would provide secure containment, and would therefore presume, subject to
rebuttal, that a lower fence was insecure, it would have been on stronger ground. For
it would have been tying the rule to the animating standard, that of secure
containment, rather 1than
making it stand free of the standard, self-contained,
45
unbending, arbitrary.

"Self-contained, unbending" is the key; the agency tied the claim of
violation not to the rule, but to the "interpretation." To reason in that way
is to abandon the hierarchical and malleable precedential model for the
rigid and universally binding model of legislation. To have that effect on
external worlds, private or judicial, the agency must act with the formality
of notice-and-comment rulemaking or adjudication. But had it retained the
standard as the ultimate basis for enforcement, no problem would have
arisen from a choice to supplement that standard with an explanatory rule.
VI. RELIANCE, NON-ACQUIESCENCE, ESTOPPEL, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS
Now it seems appropriate to turn to the complicating issue of reliance, of
investment-backed expectations. Hoctor built his perimeter fence to six
feet on the advice of the Department's local veterinarian. Is he not entitled
to rely on that advice?1 46 The stated facts, indeed, make it appear that the
Department left him alone for eight years before asserting that he had not
provided the required secure containment, 147 so perhaps it thought he was
owed at least a certain amount of credit for his reliance. The low perimeter
fence was but one of a range of violations it asserted, suggesting the
possibility that his facility had become seriously deficient (or that he had
encountered the misfortune of a throw-the-book-at-'im inspector). Note,
however, that if we take this road we are binding the Department to an
interpretation-the 1982 interpretation given to Hoctor by its local
veterinarian-with no sign that that interpretation ever acquired the dignity
of departmental policy.
Similar issues also figure importantly in another recent decision about
interpretive rules and policy statements that is otherwise quite hard to
145. Id. at 171.
146. A different question would be presented if one believed that the regulation,
uninterpreted, simply failed to give the level of notice required to sustain an agency fine.
See Manning, supra note 33, at 670 n.281.
147. See Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 168.
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understand. In Alaska ProfessionalHunters Ass 'n v. FAA, 4' 8 the question
concerned interpretation of an FAA rule specifying the equipment required
of commercial operators in aviation. In 1963, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) had in agency adjudication interpreted the CAB's similar rule not to
reach Alaskan hunting guides who flew clients on hunting excursions from
their camps as part of tour packages. 149 FAA's Alaska regional office then
began acting on the same interpretation of the FAA's rule. It never
committed that interpretation to writing, and there is no indication that the
FAA's national office knew of it. Beginning in 1990, the national office of
the FAA began to study the matter, with informal input from the
Association, 15° and in 1998 it published a notice announcing it would
henceforth interpret its regulations to treat professional hunting guides, in
Alaska as elsewhere, as commercial operators. 5' The D.C. Circuit held
that the regional office's prior practice constituted a "definitive
interpretation" of the FAA regulations involved, and that since the FAA
had already interpreted its regulations through the actions of its Alaska
regional office, it could not
reinterpret them without engaging in notice52
rulemaking1
and-comment
Note that two propositions are implicit here: first, a series of actions in
remote agency offices, neither known to nor sanctioned by its central
offices, can constitute a "definitive interpretation" of its regulations; and
second, such an interpretation, once informally adopted, freezes the state of
agency law, which cannot
subsequently be altered without notice-and53
comment rulemaking.
Does a policy that was never advertently adopted by any central office of
the agency as a whole, formally or informally, count as agency law, that
could be binding on anyone? To ask the question that way is to invoke yet
another collection of confused and unsatisfactory pages about agency
behavior. On the one hand, one can point to a number of private litigants'
campaigns, generally unsuccessful, to discover a course of conduct that has
developed here and there within an agency and then attempt to claim the
benefit of this "secret law" on the basis of requirements of consistency.
148. 177F.3d 1030, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
149. See id.
150. As here, the courts confronting publication rules appear not to notice, save perhaps
for wonder or criticism, that publication rules seem often to be adopted after extensive
discussions with affected groups, and after time intervals that could be thought at least an
implicit recognition of reliance factors. Similar consultations preceded the EPA's rule
challenged in the Appalachian Power case, that spawned the language quoted supranote 86.
151. See Alaska Profl HuntersAss 'n, 177 F.3d at 1030-31.
152. See id. at 1034-36.
153. For a powerful criticism of this aspect of the case, reaching similar conclusions by
a somewhat different route, see Pierce, supra note 12.
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Associated with these failures is the hoary doctrine that an agency will not
be estopped by the error of some functionary-farmer Merrill could not
collect on his crop insurance, albeit he had paid the premium to a local
officer of the Department of Agriculture, who had unconditionally accepted
it. The understanding here is that government is large and complex, and its
individual agents imperfectly controlled, humanly capable of error, even on
occasion corrupt. Holding the government bound by the errors of its
functionaries, even in individual dealings marked by strong reliance, would
open too wide the doors of chicanery and adventitious dispute. 5 4 On the
other hand, an agency that has consistently followed a given policy ought at
the minimum, to explain the basis for any change.'" The authority to make
and implement policy, often to the substantial disadvantage of private
individuals, carries with it an obligation of evenhandedness and
demonstrable reason. Precedent should be followed, not only because we
can usually assume, even if it would be hard to prove, that reliance has
occurred, but also because of the public's interest in "the rule of law," the
consistency and predictability of the legal framework over time. 56 In some
circumstances, the propriety of reliance on the policy as it is even precludes
changes that attach negative consequences to past, completed behavior.
From the perspective of the system of judicial precedent, the opinion of
a single trial judge or coordinate judicial tribunal, even if not challenged by
government attorneys, would not control the decisions of other trial judges
or, particularly, appellate courts in subsequent cases. That police and
prosecutors rarely stop people driving between 55 and 65 mph in a 55 mph
zone, and that this fact leads a large number of drivers to set cruise control
at 64 mph, does not preclude the possibility of police giving a speeding
ticket for drivers going 64 mph---even if one could find a memo from the
responsible chief enforcement officer instructing the police to not to pursue
such drivers. Certainly we would not think that if the Commandant of the
State Police discovered that Troop K, responsible for a distant and
unpopulated part of the state, had a policy of arresting only people
exceeding 85 mph, that made the speed limit in that part of the state, much
less the whole state, 85-irrespective of how many citizens of Troop K's
counties knew of its practice and had bought Lamborghinis. We would be
concerned if we found patterns of, say, racial discrimination underlying
.154. In direct dealings with individuals they have advised, many agencies find it useful
to assure the reliability of their advice, and statutes also often provide a safe harborfor those
individuals.
155. See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
156. My thanks to Todd Rakoff for forcefully making this point. See Rakoff, supra note
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differential enforcement; but absent such special circumstances, the speed
limit for all of us would remain at 55-and it would remain there even if
the occasional trial judge in Troop K's county acquitted a speeder charged
with driving 70 mph. Should the FAA's position be any different?

This question, in turn, breaks into two parts: respecting past conduct,
while the policy is in place, our response may be influenced by
considerations of reliance, and the instincts about unfairness and
bureaucratic regularity that attach to them. If the policy was widely
known, however inappropriate, and if it was characterized by investmentbacked expectations, then punishing behavior permitted by that policy
raises questions for an agency (which can act prospectively) that are not
faced by a court. Respecting future conduct, however, the only questions
are about the modality of change.
For Troop K's policy, never
affirmatively adopted at Headquarters, at best known and tolerated, isn't it
hard to imagine that more than an expression of disapproval is required?
The agency has never acted in those modes that officially work to create
agency "law." Even if we are willing to say that such law has in some
sense accreted from conduct in the regions, trial judgments, and the like,
treating that conclusion as the equivalent of formal agency adoption of the.
policy runs all the risks the conventional government estoppel doctrine
stands against. When the D.C. Circuit says, as it did in Alaska Professional
Hunters, that the FAA can alter the informal but longstanding policy of its
Alaska regional office only by engaging in notice-and-comment
rulemaking, 57 it stands conventional ideas about precedential systems on
their head: now the hierarchical superior is "bound" by the actions of its
inferior in a most powerful way-it is required to expend procedural
resources to control the judgments of inferior offices who followed no
procedure to adopt a position they had no authority to adopt.
As one who has sharply criticized the Supreme Court for its failure to
respect the steady and uncontroversial accretion of law in the circuit courts
of appeal, 158 I should be careful to distinguish between an obligation to
identify and promulgate a preferred policy-to which, in my judgment, the
FAA can properly be held-and an obligation to do so following
procedures more formal than need have attended its initial formulation. If
one interpretation of its enabling statutes and/or rules has come to 'be
accepted, even in just a part of its domain, it can be held to announce and
explain a new interpretation. But if that prior interpretation did not require
notice-and-comment rulemaking to take effect, indeed was simply the

157. See 177 F.3d at 1034-36.
158. See Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law,
1994 Sup. CT. R£v. 429, 436, 527-28 (1995).
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product of lower-level inertia and practice over time, requiring the FAA to
follow those procedures inflicts an unsustainable formality on the
relationship between the FAA and its inferior offices. It empowers the
regions, weakens the center, imposes a requirement of vigilance, of detailed
oversight and control, with evident implications for how the agency
expends its resources. Whatever might be the reliance equities of the
particular individuals who were the beneficiaries of the initial action, it is
hard to imagine a compelling case for placing the agency in such a
procedural straightjacket.
Even when the first interpretation has come from national headquarters,
a rule restricting the agency to one interpretive bite at the apple seems more
likely to be the product of fears about Chevron or Stinson effects than
sensible appreciation for the bureaucratic situation within the agency.
There may of course be an obligation to explain, to justify, the agency's
changed course; 159 but unless one believes the new course to be binding in
a strong sense-to be capable of serving in and of itself as the basis for a
determination of violation, to "bind" a subsequent reviewing court-such
strait-jacketing of an agency's policymaking would be unsupported in
either the APA or Chevron's explicit recognition of the appropriateness of
agency revisions over time. Indeed, one could imagine its impulse as being
to suppress rather than to encourage agency interpretation. In an earlier
decision from which Alaska ProfessionalHunters drew supportive dicta,
powerfully criticized by Professor Pierce,"6 the U.S. Department of Justice
had been silent about the interpretation it would give a regulation adopted
under the Americans with Disabilities Act-whether it would interpret that
regulation's requirement of unimpaired sight lines for wheelchair-bound
sports spectators to include moments when the crowd had leapt to its feet or
not. A stadium was sued after it built to the less expensive negative
interpretation, the Department having subsequently taken the more
demanding view. The demanding view prevailed, but only, the court said,
because the Department had "never authoritatively adopted a position.," 6 '
Had it done so, "[t]o allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its
interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment
obviously would undermine [the APA's rulemaking] requirements.' 6 2
This puts a high price indeed on ever giving interpretive advice.
Perhaps what this aspect of the two decisions draws on is the bromide
expressing strong judicial reluctance to revisit issues of statutory
interpretation, once they have been finally decided-the reluctance that
159. See, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996).
160. See Pierce, supra note 12, at 563-66,
161. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
162. Id. at 586.
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appears to drive Justice Scalia's dissent in Mead Corp. That, the courts
have generally insisted, is Congress's business. A kind of conscious
parallelism applied to rulemaking would hold, too, that once a rule had

been "interpreted," its revision was for the legislature-that is, for
rulemaking rather than further interpretation. But the parallel here is a false
one-particularly as we see that what gets denominated an interpretation
for these purposes need never have attracted the attention of national
officials, may indeed only have been in effect in one remote region.
Congress and the Court are co-equal branches of government, and the
bromide is generally defended on bases that have at best imperfect agency

analogs; the final interpretation that can have this judiciary-binding effect
is only one that comes from the Supreme Court, 63 but agency
interpretations can flow from a wide range of offices, perhaps (as here)
never even taking written form. The bromide reflects the greater
legitimacy of Congress over the courts as a source of national law, but
there is no corresponding division in the world of the administrative

agency-rather, general considerations of hierarchical authority which this
approach tends to defeat. The bromide also assumes something about
interpretation in relation to a statute, that it derives a compelled or logically

justified position from the language it interprets, yet the very existence of
section 552(a) of the APA, and also much judicial doctrine, M supposes that
neither agency statutes nor agency regulations entail such singular
65
meanings. Agency interpretations can change.1

This brings us squarely back to the issues of reliance. At least two
substantial difficulties would attend this approach. The first is that under
163. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
176-77, 185 (1994); see also Strauss, supra note 158, at 509-13,, Cf Neal v. U.S., 516 U.S.
284, 290 (1996).
164. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863-64.
165. In the concluding paragraphs of his majority opinion in Christensen, almost as an
aside, Justice Thomas included the following language, unaddressed in any other opinion:
But [strong deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation] is warranted
only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. The regulation in this case,
however, is not ambiguous-it is plainly permissive. To defer to the agency's
position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation,
to create defacto a new regulation. 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
Of course, this observation assumes the continuing validity of the strong deference
principle. Cf Manning, supra note 33. Taken out of context, the language might seem to
support the proposition that agency interpretations can occur only once; if they serve to
concretize the regulation interpreted in a statutory not precedential sense, then a
reinterpretation could be said to "permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting the
regulation, to create defacto a new regulation." Christensen,529 U.S. at 588. The trouble,
to repeat, comes from the premise.
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the standard, albeit often criticized, estoppel doctrine, Hoctor had no right
to rely on the advice offered by a local official of the Department. 166 The
second is that, even were the earlier advice the product of departmental
policy-say, a prior edition of the inspector's manual-it is difficult to
imagine a persuasive claim to more than "time to conform" (which Hoctor
apparently had) for a change in interpretation grounded in safety, and
which the agency was otherwise free to make. Suppose, in the nuclear
context, that staff interpreting a Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule
requiring containments for nuclear power plants to meet certain safety
standards had expressed its opinion that welds of a certain description
would satisfy that requirement. While that interpretation remains among
the Commission's regulatory guidance, it provides a safe harbor for plant
owners. Suppose, however, that subsequent events persuade the staff that
its judgment was wrong, and that to meet the same standards a more
elaborate weld is required. The owner of a plant who had invested millions
in those welds would have to be afforded the opportunity to show that its
welds in fact met the unamended standard; but it would no longer have any
claim that it had satisfied the regulation just because it had satisfied the
parameters of the first interpretation. Writings in this context imagine a
balance between governmental and private interests, one unlikely to be
resolved in a safety context by constructing an interminable, vested right to
continue in a course now believed to be unsafe. 16 7 Perhaps for these
reasons, Judge Posner in Hoctor attached no express value to reliance
considerations, even though revealing in a variety of ways his considerable
doubt about the safety merits.
CONCLUSION

An agency that well understood the approaches explored here would
restrict itself to using its guidance, interpretive and policy documents in a
precedential way. It would never claim for them the force that we associate

166. See Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 420 (1990)
(reaffirming Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)). While the facts of both
cases concerned claims on the Treasury, and the inappropriateness of such claims figured in
the reasoning, Office of PersonnelManagement v. Richmond reserves as an open question
only "[w]hether there are any extreme circumstances that might support estoppel in a case
not involving payment from the Treasury" and observes broadly that "[a] rule of estoppel
might create not more reliable advice, but less advice .... The inevitable fact of occasional
individual hardship cannot undermine the interest of the citizenry as a whole in the ready
availability of Government information." 496 U.S. at 433-34 (emphasis added).
167. See Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object:
Estoppel Remediesfor an Agency's Violation of its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct,
44 ADmN. L. REV. 653, 739-40 (1992).
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with statutes---either when it was in court, or when it was dealing face-toface with citizens. It would accept, even encourage, the appropriateness of
citizen reliance on advice once given, defeating that reliance only in the
face of demonstrably greater public need for change. Of course, this would
not end all issues. The costliness of notice-and-comment rulemaking these
days, if not responded to, will continue to generate pressure on agencies to
attempt to do by indirection what they cannot afford to do as they should.
Yet fear of this phenomenon, however well-based, ought not to tempt
the courts, as it unfortunately has, into locutions that discourage advicegiving or provoke agencies into accompanying their advice with warnings
that it cannot be relied upon.' 68 That is indeed a perverse teaching for the
agency, and a perverse outcome for the public. The Supreme Court has
told us, emphatically, that agency conclusions about enforcement priorities
are, and for important reasons of state, as remote from judicial control as
the actions of the administrative state can be. 69 Nonetheless, the D.C.
Circuit has, and more than once, told an administrative agency that
adoption and public explanation of an enforcement policy can only be
These, too, are
achieved by notice-and-comment rulemaking. 70
complicated questions, best left for full discussion elsewhere.' What they
have in common with today's question, in my judgment, is a certain
confusion about what it means to interpret or to set a policy-a confusion
also encouraged by our ideas about reliance, and by fear that propositions
calling for respect for agency judgment entails judicial powerlessness in
their face. Recalling Skidmore, the model of precedent, of influence rather
than command, may serve to alleviate these concerns and reclaim for
publication rules their intended, and valued, place.

168.

Cf Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In this case, an FAA

policy was accepted, apparently because the agency had taken pains to show that it was "not
in any way binding on the agency." Id. (emphasis added).

169. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-35 (1985).
170. In Chamber of Commerce v. US. Department of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), the court found that OSHA was required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking
to adopt a nationwide enforcement policy, which stressed inspection of sites that are
unwilling to cooperate with voluntary, collaborative safety programs. OSHA had found, in
state trials, that this policy significantly improved worker safety while reducing regulatory

costs. See id. at 212. In Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946-49 (D.C. Cir.
1987), the court held that the FDA was required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to
set an "action level" for unavoidable contaminants in corn. The FDA had previously
advised its inspectors and the regulated industry that it regarded enforcement below that
level as inappropriate. See id. at 945, 948.
171. For an insightful discussion on these questions, see Titolo, supra note 11, and
Thomas, supra note 11.

